A fearsome land

FEW countries have a more fearsome reputation than Afghanistan when it comes to 'greeting' armed invaders. Experience suggests that US military analysts should have been examining the history books closely before making their final plans. Empire builders from Alexander the Great to the former Red Army have ventured into this hostile territory - and most have bitterly regretted doing so.

History also suggests that taking on the Afghans need not prove disastrous - provided the right lessons are learned.

Alexander was one of the more successful warrior leaders to march into this mountainous terrain, capturing a supposedly unassailable fortress and cowing the locals.

He used Afghanistan principally as a jumping-off point for further conquests in northern India - as did Babur, the first of the Moghul Muslim emperors, whose rule eventually stretched across much of the sub-continent.

The Moghuls' rule in India was ended by new conquerors who came from the sea - the British, who suffered more than one last stand around the flag at the hands of the Afghans

The British approached from the Indian side, and their first foray into the country had little to do with any desire to take root there; and much to do with fears of incursions into their domain from the Russians, who were expanding their empire from the Central Asian side.

When Queen Victoria's 'Army of the Indus' set off for Kabul in 1838, its campaign proved an initial success, capturing the fortress at Ghazni with a daring frontal attack before taking the Afghan capital.

The trouble came when the army had to stay on to keep Britain's puppet ruler on the throne, and the former king, Dost Mohammed, was taken to India as a prisoner.

The position of the Kabul garrison grew steadily worse until a full-scale rebellion erupted in 1841. The British agreed to pull back to India, but the Afghans picked off the army as it retreated through the passes, before wiping out its remnants at Gandamak.

There was a successful and heroic defence at Jallalabad to cheer the British public, and an 'Army of Retribution' blew up the Kabul bazaar and freed hostages. However, the British had to return Dost Mohammed to his throne and decided to leave the Afghans alone.

The experience of combating an enemy who were born guerrilla fighters, and whose jezzail guns were superior to British muskets in both range and accuracy, curbed Britain's expansionist tendencies for a few decades.

By 1878, the British were once more at war with the Afghans, again over suspected Russian involvement beyond India's North-West Frontier.

Once more the initial campaign went well, but then Britain's chief diplomat in the country was murdered, his escort fought a brave and bloody last stand, and British soldiers were across the frontier yet again.

After the British occupied Kabul, a holy war was declared against them and Afghan warriors converged on the capital.

This time the British had a greater technical advantage, using star shells to illuminate the oncoming masses, who were shot down in great numbers.

Disaster was to follow again for the British, when part of a regiment was cut off and fought to the last man at Maiwand, after their commander tried to take on a much larger Afghan force.

Again, although the British had largely won their set-piece battles, they felt it wise to leave the country, though fighting with the Afghans continued on the frontier.

So, had lessons been learned? Apparently not; a century after Maiwand the forces of the Soviet Union invaded the country which had only been tinkered with by their Tsarist forbears. The Soviets put their own communist ruler in place, but discovered - like the British before them - that they had to stay on to keep him in place.

Their 100,000 troops managed to lift sieges and open passes, and the Soviets drove Afghan freedom fighters into the hills. But by 1984 their casualty figures had mounted to 15,000 and they had lost control of most territory beyond the towns.

After 1986 one of their most effective weapons - air attacks, particularly using helicopter gunships - had been undermined because the CIA had supplied the freedom fighters with ground-to-air missiles.

In addition, the Russian conscript soldiers were terrified of capture, in a land where Rudyard Kipling had advised their British predecessors to "roll to your rifle and blow out your brains" rather than be taken.

The Soviets pulled out by agreement in 1988, but Afghanistan remained in chaos brought about by rival warlords, until the Taliban imposed their rule over much of the shattered country.

Critics of US policy now point to the war against the Soviets, claiming the CIA not only helped to train and equip Islamic fighters including the Saudi-born Osama bin Laden, but actually preferred dealing with foreigners such as him because they were more predictable than the local tribesmen.

So, does all this mean the US military is courting inevitable disaster? Surprisingly, perhaps, the answer seems to be 'not necessarily'. Experience, from Alexander's time and even that of the British Raj, suggests that limited campaigns for tightly-set objectives can succeed.

The catastrophes for invaders have invariably come when they try to occupy the country - so that is the result the United States and her allies should strive to avoid.

Updated: 10:09 Monday, October 08, 2001